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ABSTRACT 
Self-propagating malware (e.g., an Internet worm) exploits security loopholes in software to infect 
servers and then use them to scan the Internet for more vulnerable servers. While the mechanisms of 
worm infection and their propagation models are well understood, defense against worms remains an 
open problem. One branch of defense research investigates the behavioral difference between worm-
infected hosts and normal hosts to set them apart. One particular observation is that a worm-infected 
host, which scans the Internet with randomly selected addresses, has a much higher connection-failure 
rate than a normal host. Rate-limit algorithms have been proposed to control the spread of worms by 
traffic shaping based on connection failure rate. However, these rate-limit algorithms can work properly 
only if it is possible to measure failure rates of individual hosts efficiently and accurately. This paper 
points out a serious problem in the prior method. To address this problem, we first propose a solution 
based on a highly efficient double-bitmap data structure, which places only a small memory footprint on 
the routers, while providing good measurement of connection failure rates whose accuracy can be tuned 
by system parameters. Furthermore, we propose another solution based on shared register array data 
structure, achieving better memory efficiency and much larger estimation range than our double-bitmap 
solution. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Self-propagating malware (e.g., an Internet worm) exploits security loopholes in server 
software. It infects vulnerable servers and then uses them to scan the Internet for more 
vulnerable servers [1 - 3]. In the past two decades, we have witnessed a continuous stream of 
new worms raging across the Internet [4 - 7], sometimes infecting tens of thousands or even 
millions of computers and causing widespread service disruption or network congestion. The 
mechanisms of worm propagation have been well understood [8 - 11], and various propagation 
models were developed [12 - 15] to demonstrate analytically the properties of how worms 
spread among hosts across networks. Significant efforts have also been made to mitigate worms, 
with varying degrees of success and limitations. Worms remain a serious threat to the Internet. 
Patching defects in software is the most common defense measure, not only to worms but also 
to other types of malware. However, it is a race for who (good guys or bad guys) will find the 
security defects first. Software is vulnerable and its hosts are subject to infection before the 
security problems are identified and patched. Moreover, not all users will patch their systems 
timely, leaving a window of vulnerability to the adversary that will try to exploit every 
opportunity. Moore et al. investigated worm containment technologies such as address 
blacklisting and content filtering, and such systems must interdict nearly all Internet paths in 
order to be successful [13]. Williamson proposed to modify the network stack to bound the rate 
of connection requests made to distinct destinations [16]. To be effective, it requires a majority 
of all Internet hosts are upgraded to the new network stack, which is difficult to realize. Similar 
Internet-wide upgrades are assumed by other host-based solutions in the literature, each 
employing intrusion detection and automatic control techniques whose supporting models must 
be calibrated for the specific machine that they will reside upon [17 - 20]. 
Avoiding the requirement of coordinated effort across the whole Internet, the distributed anti-
worm architecture (DAW) [21] was designed for deployment on the edge routers of an Internet 
service provider (ISP) under a single administrative control. DAW observes a behavioral 
difference between worm-infected hosts and normal hosts: as an infected host scans random 
addresses for vulnerable hosts, it makes connection attempts but most will fail, whereas normal 
users's connection attempts to their familiar servers are mostly successful. By observing the 
failed connections made by the hosts, the edge routers are able to separate out hosts with large 
failure rates and contain the propagation of the worms. With a basic rate-limit algorithm, a 
temporal rate-limit algorithm and a spatial rate-limit algorithm, DAW offers the flexibility of 
tightly restricting the worm's scanning activity, while allowing the normal hosts to make 
successful connections at any rate. 
However, for rate limit to work properly, we must be able to measure the connection failure 
rates of individual hosts accurately and efficiently. This paper points out that using Internet 
Control Message Protocol (ICMP) messages for this purpose [21] is flawed as they are widely 
blocked on today's Internet, and the total number of message packets in this big data [22] [23] 
[30] [31] and cloud computing [36 - 39] era is enormous. In this paper, we first design a novel 
measurement method that solves the problem with a highly efficient data structure based on 
bitmaps [41], which keeps record of connection attempts and results (success or fail) in bits, 
from which we can recover the connection failure rates, while removing the duplicate 
connection failures (which may cause bias against normal hosts). Our double-bitmap solution is 
highly efficient for online per-packet operations, and the simulation results show that not only 
does the data structure place a small memory footprint on the routers, but also it provides good 
measurement of connection failure rates whose accuracy can be tuned by system parameters. 
However, we discover the double-bitmap solution has a limitation: it is difficult to extend the 
estimation range in such memory constrain without causing estimation inaccuracy. In order to 
address this problem, we propose another solution based on shared register array data structure 
[42], achieving better memory efficiency and much larger estimation range than our double-
bitmap solution. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives the propagation model of random-
scanning worms and reviews the rate-limit algorithms based on connection failure rates. Section 
3 explains the problem causing inaccurate failure rate measurement and provides a novel 
solution with double bitmaps. Section 4 describes our shared register array solution in detail. 
Section 5 presents simulation results. Section 6 draws the conclusion. 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1. Propagation of Random-scanning Worms 
This paper considers a type of common worms that replicates through random scanning of the 
Internet for vulnerable hosts. Their propagation can be roughly characterized by the classical 
simple epidemic model [26 - 28]: 
 
( )
( )(1 ( )),
( )
di t
i t i t
d t
    (1) 
where ( )i t  is the percentage of vulnerable hosts that are infected with respect to time t , and   
is the rate at which a worm-infected host detects other vulnerable hosts. More specifically, it has 
been derived [27] that the derivative formula of worm propagation is 
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where r  is the rate at which an infected host scans the address space, N  is the size of the 
address space, and V  is the total number of vulnerable hosts. 
Solving the equation, the percentage of vulnerable hosts that are infected over time is 
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It is clear that ( )t   is inversely proportional to the scanning rate r , which is the number of 
random addresses that an infected host attempts to contact (for finding and then infecting 
vulnerable hosts) in a certain measurement period. If we can limit the rate of worm scanning, we 
can slow down their propagation, buying time for system administrators across the Internet to 
take actions. 
2.2. Behavior-based Rate-Limit Algorithms 
In order to perform rate-limit, we need to identify hosts that are likely to be worm-infected. One 
way to do so is observing different behaviors exhibited from infected hosts and normal hosts. 
One important behavioral observation was made by [21], which argues that infected hosts have 
much larger failure rates in their initiated Transfer Contorl Protocol (TCP) connections than 
normal hosts. We can then apply rate limits to hosts with connection failure rates beyond a 
threshold and thus restrict the speed at which worms are spread to other vulnerable hosts. (Same 
as our work, the paper [21] studies worms that spread via TCP, which accounts for the majority 
of Internet traffic.) Below we briefly describe the host behavior difference in connection failure 
rate, which is defined as the number of failed TCP connection attempts made by a source host 
during a certain measurement period, where each attempt corresponds to a SYN packet and each 
SYN-ACK signals a successful attempt, while the absence of a SYN-ACK means a failure. 
 Suppose a worm is designed to attack a software vulnerability in a certain version of 
web servers from a certain vendor. Consider an arbitrary infected host. Let N  be the 
total number of possible IP addresses and N   be the number of addresses held by web 
servers, which listen to port 80. N N  because web servers only account for a small 
fraction of the accessible Internet. As the infected host picks a random IP address and 
sends a SYN packet to initiate a TCP connection to port 80 of that address, the 
connection only has a chance of /N N  to be successful. It has a chance of 
1 / 1N N    to fail. The experiment in [21] shows that only 0.4% of all connections 
made to random addresses at TCP port 80 are successful. Together with a high scanning 
rate, the connection failure rate of an infect host will be high. Moreover, the measured 
connection failure rate is an approximation of the host's scanning rate. 
 The connection failure rate of a normal host is generally low because a typical user 
accesses pre-configured servers (such as mail server and DNS server) that are known to 
be up for most of the time. An exception is web browsing, where the domain names of 
web servers are used, which again lead to successful connections for most of the time 
according to our experiences. Cases when the domain names are mistyped, it result in 
DNS lookup failure and no connection attempts will be made --- consequently no 
connection failure will occur. 
By measuring the connection failure rates of individual hosts, the paper [21] proposes to limit 
the rate at which connection attempts are made by any host whose failure rate exceeds a certain 
threshold. By limiting the rate of connection attempts, it reduces the host's connection failure 
rate back under the threshold. An array of rate-limit algorithms were proposed. The basic 
algorithm rate-limits individual hosts with excessive failure rates. The temporal rate-limit 
algorithm can tolerate temporary high failure rates of normal hosts but make sure the long-term 
average failure rates are kept low. The spatial rate-limit algorithm can tolerate some hosts' high 
failure rates but make sure that the average failure rates in a network are kept low. 
An important component that complements the rate-limit algorithms is the measurement of 
connection failure rates of individual hosts. This component is however not adequately 
addressed by [21]. As we will point out in the next section, its simple method does not provide 
accurate measurement on today's Internet. We will provide two new methods that can efficiently 
solve this important problem with two novel data structures: bitmap and shared register array. 
3. A DOUBLE-BITMAP SOLUTION FOR LIMITING WORM PROPAGATION 
In this section, we explain the problem that causes inaccurate measurement of connection failure 
rates and provide a new measurement solution that can work with existing rate-limit algorithms 
to limit worm propagation. 
3.1. Failure Replies and the Problem of Blocked ICMP Messages 
We first review the method of measuring the connection failure rates in [21]. After a source host 
sends a SYN packet to a destination host, the connection request fails if the destination host 
does not exist or does not listen on the port that the SYN is sent to. In the former case, an ICMP 
host-unreachable packet is returned to the source host; in the latter case, a TCP RESET packet is 
returned. The ICMP host-unreachable or TCP RESET packet is defined as a failure reply. The 
connection failure rate of a host s  is measured as the rate of failure replies that are sent to s . 
The rationale behind this method [21] is that the rate of failure replies sent back to the source 
host should be close to the rate of failed connections initiated by the host. The underlying 
assumption is that, for each failed connection, a failure reply (either an ICMP host-unreachable 
packet or a TCP RESET packet) is for sure to be sent back to the source host. 
However, this assumption may not be realistic. Today, many firewalls and domain gateways are 
configured to suppress failure replies. In particular, many organizations block outbound ICMP 
host-unreachable packets because attacks routinely use ICMP as a reconnaissance tool. When 
the ICMP host-unreachable packets are blocked, the rate of failure replies sent back to a source 
host will be essentially much lower than the rate of failed connections that the host has initiated. 
In other words, a potential worm-affected host may initiate many failed connections, but only a 
handful of failure replies will be sent back to it. Under these circumstances, the connection 
failure rate measured by failure replies will be far lower than the actual failure rate, which in 
turn misleads the rate-limit algorithms and makes them less effective. 
To make the problem more complicated, when we measure the connection failure rates of 
individual hosts, all failed connections made from the same source host to the same destination 
host in each measurement period should be treated as duplicates and thus counted only once. 
We use an example to illustrate the reason: Suppose the mail server of a host is down and the 
email reader is configured to automatically attempt to connect to the server after each timeout 
period (e.g., one minute). In this case, a normal host will generate a lot of failed connections to 
the same destination, pushing its connection failure rate much higher than the usual value (when 
the server is not down) and falsely triggering the rate-limit algorithms to restrict the host's 
access to the Internet. Therefore, when we measure the connection failure rate of a source host, 
we want to remove the duplicates to the same destination and measure the rate of failed 
connections to distinct destinations. 
3.2. SYN/SYN-ACK Solution and Problems of Duplicate Failures and Memory 
Consumption 
We cannot use failure replies to measure the connection failure rates. Another simple solution is 
to use SYN and SYN-ACK packets. Each TCP connection begins with a SYN packet from the 
source host. If a SYN-ACK packet is received, we count the connection as a successful one; 
otherwise, we count it as a failed connection. (Technically speaking, a third packet of ACK 
from the source to the destination completes the establishing of the connection. For our anti-
worm purpose, however, the returned SYN-ACK already shows that the destination host is 
reachable and listens to the port, which thus does not signal worm behavior --- random scanning 
likely hits unreachable hosts or hosts not listening to the port.) 
Using SYN and SYN-ACK packets, a naive solution is for each edge router to maintain two 
counters, sk  and rk , for each encountered source address, where sk  is the rate of SYN packets 
sent by the source (i.e., the number of SYN packets sent during a measurement period), and rk  
is the rate of SYN-ACK packets received by the source (i.e., the number of SYN-ACKs 
received during a measurement period). The connection failure rate k  is simply 
s rk k . 
This simple solution is memory efficient, as it only requires 64 bits per source host for failure 
rate measurement, assuming each counter takes 32 bits. However, this solution cannot address 
the problem of duplicate failures. As discussed in Section 3.1, when we measure the connection 
failure rate of a source host, we want to remove the duplicates to the same destination in the 
same measurement period, because measuring duplicate failures may cause bias against normal 
hosts. Maintaining two counters alone cannot achieve the goal of removing duplicate failures. 
An alternative solution is to have the edge router store a list of distinct destination addresses for 
each source host. However, such per-source information consumes a large amount of memory. 
Suppose each address costs 32 bits. The memory required to store each source host's address list 
will grow linearly with the rate of distinct destination hosts that the source host initiates 
connection requests to. For example, the main gateway at our campus observes an average of 
more than 10 million distinct source-destination pairs per day. If the edge router keeps per-
source address list, it will cost more than 320 megabits of memory, which soon exhausts the 
small on-die SRAM memory space of the edge router. Therefore, this solution is not feasible 
either. 
The major goal of this paper is to accurately measure the connection failure rates with a small 
memory. However, tradeoffs must be made between measurement accuracy and memory 
consumption under the requirement of duplicate failure removal. Existing research uncovered 
the advantages of using Bloom filters [28] [29] or bitmaps [24] [25] [32 - 35] [40] to compress 
the connection information in limited memory space and automatically filter duplicates, which 
can be adopted to measure the connection failure rates. For example, the edge router can 
maintain two bitmaps for each source host, and map each SYN/SYN-ACK packet of the host 
into a bit in the host's corresponding bitmap, from which the rate of SYN/SYN-ACK packets of 
each host can be recovered. However, the measurement accuracy depends on setting the bitmap 
size for each source host properly in advance. In practice, it is difficult to pre-determine the 
values as different source hosts may initiate connection requests at unpredictable and different 
rates, which limits the practicability of this solution as well. 
3.3. Double Bitmaps 
In order to address the problems of duplicate failures and memory consumption, instead of 
using per-source address lists or bitmaps, we incorporate two shared bitmaps to store the 
SYN/SYN-ACK information of all source hosts. Our double-bitmap solution includes two 
phases: in the first phase, the edge router keeps recoding the SYN/SYN-ACK packets of all 
source hosts through setting bits in the bitmaps; in the second phase, the network management 
center will recover the connection failure rates from the two bitmaps based on maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE), and notify the edge router to apply rate limit algorithms to limit 
the connection attempts made by any host whose failure rate exceeds some threshold. Below we 
will explain the two phases, and then mathematically derive an estimator to calculate the 
connection failure rate. 
3.3.1. Phase I: SYN / SYN-ACK Encoding 
In our solution, each edge router maintains two bitmaps sB  and rB , which encode the distinct 
SYN packets and SYN-ACK packets of all source hosts within its network, respectively. Let 
sm  and rm  be the number of bits in sB  and rB  correspondingly. Below we will explain how 
an edge router encodes the distinct SYN packet information into sB , which can later be used to 
estimate the SYN sending rate sk  for each source host. The way for the edge router to encode 
the distinct SYN-ACK packet information into rB  is quite similar, which we omit. 
For each source host src , the edge router randomly selects sl  ( sm ) bits from the bitmap sB  
to form a logical bitmap src , which is denoted as ( )LB src . The indices of the selected bits are 
( [0])H src R , ( [1])H src R , , ( [ 1])sH src R l  , where   is bitwise XOR, ( )H  
is a hash function whose range is [0, )sm , and R  is an integer array storing randomly chosen 
constants to arbitrarily alter the hash result. Similarly, the logical bitmap can be constructed 
from sB  for any other hosts. Essentially, we embed the bitmaps of all possible hosts in sB . The 
bit-sharing relationship is dynamically determined on the fly as each new host src will be 
allocated a logical bitmap ( )LB src  from sB  to store its SYN packet information. 
Given above notations and data structures, the online coding works as follows. At the beginning 
of each measurement period, all bits in sB  are reset to zeros. Suppose a SYN packet signatured 
with a ,src dst  host address pair is routed by the edge router. The router will randomly select 
a bit from the logical bitmap ( )LB src  based on src  and dst , and set this bit in sB  to be one. 
The index of the bit to be set for this SYN packet is given as follows: 
 ( [ ( )mod ]).sH src R H dst K l    
The second hash, ( )H dst K , ensures that the bit is pseudo-randomly selected from 
( )LB src , and the private key K  is introduced to prevent the hash collision attacks. Therefore, 
the overall effect to store the SYN packet information is : 
[ ( [ ( )mod ])] 1.sB H src R H dst K l    
Similarly, the edge router only needs to set a bit in the bitmap rB  to be one for each SYN-ACK 
packet using the same mechanism. Note that in our solution, to store a SYN/SYN-ACK packet, 
the router only performs two hash operations and sets a single bit in its bitmap, which is quite 
efficient. In addition, duplicates of SYN or SYN-ACK information with same ,src dst  
signature will mark the same bit in the shared bitmaps such that the duplicate information is 
filtered as desired. 
3.3.2. Phase II: Failure Rate Measurement 
At the end of each measurement period, the edge router will send the two bitmaps sB  and rB  to 
the network management center (NMC), which will estimate connection failure rate k  for each 
source host src  based on sB  and rB , and notify the edge router to apply rate limit algorithms 
to limit the connection attempts made by any host whose failure rate exceeds some threshold. 
Since rate-limit algorithms have been fully studied in [21], we will focus on the measurement of 
connection failure rates based on the register arrays. The measurement process is described in 
the following. 
First, the NMC extracts the logical bitmaps ( )LB src  and ( )LB src  of each source host src  
from the two bitmaps sB  and rB , respectively. Second, the NMC counts the number of zeros in 
( )LB src , ( )LB src , sB  and rB , which are denoted by 
l
sU , 
l
rU , 
m
sU , and 
m
rU , respectively. 
Then the NMC divides them by the corresponding bitmap size sl , rl , sm , and rm , and 
calculates the fraction of bits whose values are zeros in ( )LB src , ( )LB src , sB  and rB  
correspondingly. That is, /l ls s sV U l , /
l l
r r rV U l , /
m m
s s sV U m , and /
m m
r r rV U m . 
Finally, the NMC uses the following formula to estimate connection failure rate k  for source 
host src : 
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3.3.3. Derivation of the estimator 
Now we follow the standard MLE method to get the MLE estimators ˆsk  and 
ˆ
rk  of sk  and rk , 
respectively, and then derive kˆ  given by (4). Since the way to derive the MLE estimator for sk  
and rk  is quite similar, we will only derive the MLE estimator formula for 
ˆ
sk , and directly give 
the result for ˆrk . To derive 
ˆ
sk , we first analyze the probability ( )sq k  for an arbitrary bit in 
( )LB src  to be '0', and use ( )sq k  to establish the likelihood function L  to observer 
l
sU  '0' bits 
in ( )LB src . Finally, maximizing L  with respect to sk  will lead to the MLE estimator, 
ˆ
sk . 
Note that sk  is the actual rate of distinct SYN packets sent by a source host src , and sn  is the 
rate of distinct SYN packets sent by all hosts within the router's network. Consider an arbitrary 
bit b  in ( )LB src . A SYN packet sent by src  has a probability of 1/ sl  to set b  to '1', and a 
SYN packet sent by any other host has a probability of 1 / sm  to set b  to '1'. Hence, the 
probability ( )sq k  for bit b  to remain '0' at the end of the measurement period is 
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Because the bits in any logical bit array are randomly selected from the bitmap sB , each of the 
sn  SYN packets has about the same probability of 1 / sm  to choose any bit in sB . So for an 
arbitrary bit in sB , the probability for it to be '0' after storing all sn  distinct SYN packets is 
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In this sense, the number of zero bits in sB  follows a binomial distribution ( , ( ))
m
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Substituting (7) to (5), and replacing ( )msE V  by its instance value 
m
sV , we have the following 
instance value for ( )sq k : 
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Given the probability for each bit in ( )LB src  to be '0' as ( )sq k , we can establish the likelihood 
function to observe 
l
sU  '0' bits in ( )LB src  as follows: 
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The MLE estimator of sk  is the value of sk  that maximizes the above likelihood function. 
Namely, 
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To find ˆsk , we take logarithm on both sides, and then perform the first order derivative to 
obtain 
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where ( )sq k  is computed as 
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Since 1s sm l   and 0sn  ,  ( )sq k  and ( )sq k  cannot be 0. Setting the right side of (11) be 
zero, we have 
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Substituting above equation to (8) and solving for sk , we get the MLE estimator of sk : 
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Similarly, we can derive the MLE estimator of rk : 
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Since 
s rk k k  , given the MLE estimators 
ˆ
sk  and 
ˆ
rk  of sk  and rk , we can easily derive the 
estimator of k  as 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ .s rk k k    (16) 
Substituting (14) and (15) to the above equation, we derive the estimator kˆ  as described in (4). 
Note that if the two bitmaps sB  and rB  have the same size, and the two logical bitmaps for 
each source host also have the same size, i.e., 
s rm m m   and s rl l l  , then the estimator 
for the connection failure rate k  will be in a more compact form: 
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4. A REGISTER ARRAY SOLUTION FOR LIMITING WORM PROPAGATION 
In the double-bitmap solution, we discover the bitmap data structure has a limitation: it is 
difficult to extend the estimation range in such memory constrain without causing estimation 
inaccuracy. In order to address this problem, we propose another solution based on double 
shared register arrays called DSRA. Instead of sharing at bit level, DSRA tries to share at the 
register level. The size of each register is determined by the maximum estimation cardinality. 
For example, we can set the size of register to be 5 bits for the estimation up to 232. We will 
incorporate two shared register arrays to store the SYN/SYN-ACK information for all source 
hosts. Our DSRA solution also includes two phases: SYN/SYN-ACK encoding and failure rate 
measurement. We will explain the two phases in detail, and then derive an estimator of the 
connection failure rate mathematically. 
4.1. Phase I: SYN / SYN-ACK Encoding 
In this phase, each edge router maintains two register arrays 
sM  and rM  to encode the distinct 
SYN packets and SYN-ACK packets of all source hosts. Let st  and rt  be the number of 
registers in 
sM  and rM  correspondingly. In the register array sM , the ith register is denoted 
by [ ],0s sM i i t  . Next we will explain how an edge router encodes the distinct SYN packet 
information into 
sM . The way for the router to encode the distinct SYN-ACK packet 
information into 
rM  is quite similar. 
Similar to our double-bitmap solution, in our DSRA solution, the edge router randomly selects 
sf  ( st ) registers from the physical register array sM  to form a virtual register array for each 
source host src , which is denoted by ( )VR src . The indices of the selected registers in 
sM  
are ( [0])H src R , ( [1])H src R , , ( [ 1])sH src R f  , where ( )H  is a hash function 
whose range is [0, )st . With these notations and data structures, the online coding works in the 
following.  At the beginning of each measurement period, all registers in 
sM  are reset to zeros. 
When a SYN packet signatured with a ,src dst  host address pair is routed by the edge router. 
The router will perform the hashing below: 
1 2
( [ ( ) mod ])
( ) ... ,
sp H src R H dst K f
q H dst x x
  
  
 
where p  is the hash result of ( [ ( )mod ])sH src R H dst K f   and 1 2...q x x   is binary 
format of the hash output ( )H dst . Similar to online encoding phase of double-bitmap solution, 
the SYN packet is pseudo-randomly mapped to a register at index p . The operation to store the 
SYN packet information in this register is simple. Let ( )LZ q  be the number of leading zeros in 
q plus one. For example, if q  = 001…, then ( ) 3LZ q  . We will update the mapped register if 
its current value is smaller than ( )LZ q . Therefore, the overall effect to store the SYN packet 
information is: 
[ ] max( [ )], ( )).s sM p M p LZ q  
The edge router only needs to set a value to a register in the register array for each SYN-ACK 
packet using the same mechanism. In addition, duplicates of SYN or SYN-ACK information 
with same ,src dst  signature will map to the same register and set the same value in the 
shared register array such that the duplicate information is filtered. 
4.2. Phase II: Failure Rate Measurement 
At the end of each measurement period, the edge router will send the two register arrays 
sM  
and 
rM  to the NMC, which will estimate connection failure rate k  for each source host src  
based on 
sM  and rM , and notify the edge router to apply rate limit algorithms if needed. The 
measurement process is described in the following. 
First, the NMC extracts the virtual register arrays ( )VR src  and ( )VR src  of each source host 
src  from the two shared register arrays 
sM  and rM , respectively. Then the NMC uses the 
HyperLogLog algorithm [43] to estimate the number of distinct elements in 
sM , rM , ( )VR src  
and ( )VR src , which are denoted by ˆ
sn , ˆrn , ˆ
a
sn  and ˆ
a
rn , respectively. Note that 
HyperLogLog algorithm is used to estimate the total number of distinct elements nˆ  that has 
been recorded by a register array M with f registers, denoted by [ ],0 .M i i f   The 
estimation from all registers in M  is 
 
1
1
2 [ ]
0
ˆ 2 ,
f
M j
f
j
n f




 
  
 
   (18) 
where s  is a constant which equals 
 
1
2
0
2
log ( ) .
1
f
f
u
f du
u


  
      
   (19) 
Finally, the NMC uses the following formula to estimate connection failure rate k  for source 
host src : 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ
a a
s s s s r r r r
s s s s r r r r
t f n n t f n n
k
t f f t t f f t
   
      
    
  (20) 
4.3. Derivation of the estimator 
We first use noise estimation method to get the estimators ˆsk  and 
ˆ
rk  of sk  and rk , 
respectively, and then derive kˆ  given by (20). Similarly, we will first derive the estimator 
formula for ˆsk , and directly give the result for 
ˆ
rk .  
Recall that sn  is the total number of all distinct SYN packets and 
a
sn is the number of distinct 
elements recorded by ( )VR src , which is the source host src’s SYN packet cardinality plus the 
noise introduced by other source hosts who are sharing these registers. So the noise term in 
( )VR src  is a
s sn k . Moreover, from the source host src ’s view, the SYN packets of all other 
source hosts ( )s sn k  are noise. Since each noise packet has approximately an equal 
probability to be recorded by any register due to the random selection of registers by virtual 
register array, the average noise elements stored by an arbitrary register are s s
s
n k
t

 . 
Hence, the total noise in the sf  registers of ( )VR src , 
a
s sn k , can also be considered as the 
sum of sf  independent random noise stored in the virtual register array: 
 ( ) .a s ss s s
s
n k
E n k f
t

    (21) 
By the law of large numbers in the probability theory, when sf  is large, ( )
a
s sE n k can be 
replaced by an instance value, 
a
s sn k . Hence, we have 
 .
a
a s s s s s s
s s s s
s s s s s
n k t f n n
n k f k
t t f f t
 
     
  
  (22) 
Then, we get the estimator of sk : 
 
ˆ ˆˆ .
a
s s s s
s
s s s s
t f n n
k
t f f t
 
  
  
  (23) 
Similarly, we can derive the estimator of rk : 
 
ˆ ˆˆ .
a
r r r r
r
r r r r
t f n n
k
t f f t
 
  
  
  (24) 
Since ˆ ˆ ˆs rk k k  , we can derive the estimator kˆ  as described in (20). Note that if s rt t t   
and s rf f f  , then the estimator for the connection failure rate k  can be presented in a 
more compact format: 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ .
a a
s r s rn n n ntfk
t f f t
  
  
  
  (25)
  
5. SIMULATION 
We evaluate the measurement accuracy of our estimator for the connection failure rate through 
simulations. Recall that the major goal of this paper is to provide a good estimator for 
measuring the connection failure rates of individual hosts that can work well in a small memory. 
Hence, in our simulations, we purposely allocate memory with small sizes to encode the 
information of distinct SYN and SYN-ACK packets for all source hosts, such that the average 
memory size for each source host will be ranging from 10 bits to 40 bits for double-bitmap 
solution, and ranging from 2.5 bits to 10 bits for DSRA solution. As we explained in Section 
3.2, the solution with per-source address lists or bitmaps will not work with this small memory 
size. Therefore, our solutions outperform in the aspect of greatly reducing the required online 
memory footprint for connection failure rate measurement while achieving duplicate failure 
removal. 
5.1. Simulation for double-bitmap solution 
Our simulations are conducted under the following setups. We simulate 50,000 distinct source 
hosts as normal hosts, and 100 distinct source hosts as worm-affected hosts. For the normal 
hosts, they will send distinct SYN packets to different destination hosts, with a rate following an 
exponential distribution whose mean is 5 distinct SYN packets per minute. For each distinct 
SYN packet that a normal host sends out, a corresponding SYN-ACK packet will be sent back 
to the host with a probability, which follows a uniform distribution in the range of [0.8, 1.0]. As 
for the worm-affected hosts, we simulate their aggressive scanning behavior by having them 
send distinct SYN packets to different destination hosts with a higher rate, which follows 
another exponential distribution whose mean is 10 distinct SYN packets per second. Since the 
worm-affected hosts will randomly scan the whole destination space, their failure rate is 
expected to be very high as we explained earlier. Therefore, in our simulations, no SYN-ACK 
packets will be sent back to them. Suppose each measurement period is 1 minute. Then each 
normal host will send 5 distinct SYN packets and receive 4.5 distinct SYN-ACK packets on 
average, and each worm-affected host will send 600 distinct SYN packets and 0 SYN-ACK 
packet on average, during each measurement period. 
In our simulations, all the SYN and SYN-ACK packets are processed by a single simulated 
edge router and a simulated network management center according to our two-phase 
measurement scheme. First of all, the SYN and SYN-ACK packets are encoded into two m-bit 
bitmaps sB  and rB  of the edge router, respectively, as described in Section 3.3.1 (Phase I: 
SYN/SYN-ACK Encoding). After all packets are encoded into the two bitmaps sB  and rB , the 
edge router will send sB  and rB  to the network management center, which will estimate the 
connection failure rate of each source host based on sB  and rB  offline, as described in Section 
3.3.2 (Phase II: Failure Rate Measurement).  
We conduct three sets of simulations with three different sizes of memory allocated for the 
bitmaps sB  and rB , s rm m m   0.5Mb, 1Mb, and 2Mb, to observe the measurement 
accuracy under different memory constraints. The sizes of the logical bitmaps for each host is 
set to be 300s rl l l   . Figure. 1-3 present the simulation results when the allocated 
memory m equals 2Mb, 1Mb, and 0.5Mb, respectively. Since there are a total of 50,100 source 
hosts, the average memory consumption per source host will be about 40 bits, 20 bits, and 10 
bits, accordingly. In each figure, each point represents a source host, with its x-coordinate 
showing the actual connection failure rate k  (per minute) and y-coordinate showing the 
estimated connection failure rate kˆ  (per minute) measured by our scheme. The equality line y = 
x is also drawn for reference. Clearly, the closer a point is to the quality line, the better the 
measurement result. 
 
 
Figure 1. Measurement accuracy of 
connection failure rate per minute. m = 
2Mb, l = 300. 
 
Figure 2. Measurement accuracy of 
connection failure rate per minute. m = 
1Mb, l = 300. 
 
 
Figure 3. Measurement accuracy of connection failure rate per minute. m = 0.5Mb, l = 300. 
 
From the three figures, one can observe that the measurement result for the connection failure 
rates of our scheme is quite accurate under all three different memory constraints. For almost 
every source host, the measured failure rate closely follows its real failure rate as shown in the 
figures. There is a tendency for the measurement result to be slightly more accurate with a 
larger memory size (compare Figure. 1 and Figure. 3). However, for our scheme, a small 
memory of size m = 0.5Mb (equivalent to 10 bits per source host on average) is adequate 
enough to generate sound measurement results as shown in Figure. 3. Recall that for the 
solution storing per-source address list, the destination address of every SYN packet must be 
stored for every source host. So for that solution, a normal source host initiating 5 connection 
requests (5 distinct SYN packets) per minute will require at least 32 × 5 = 160  bits to record its 
SYN packets, and a worm-affected host sending 10 SYN packets per second will require at least 
32 × 600 = 19200 bits, for each measurement period of one minute. Clearly, through utilizing 
double bitmaps, our scheme outperforms the solution storing address lists, because it can work 
well with a much more strict memory constraint.  
5.2. Simulation for DSRA solution 
We will evaluate the impact of memory space on the accuracy of connection failure rate 
estimation for double-bitmap solution and DSRA solution. For both solutions, we simulate 
500,000 distinct source hosts as normal hosts, and 1,000 distinct source hosts as worm-affected 
hosts. The normal hosts will send distinct SYN packets to different destination hosts, with a rate 
following an exponential distribution whose mean is 5 distinct SYN packets per minute. The 
worm-affected hosts will send distinct SYN packets to different destination hosts with a higher 
rate, which follows another exponential distribution whose mean is 6000 distinct SYN packets 
per minute. The probability of sending back the SYC-ACK is the same as previous simulation. 
Suppose the measurement period is 1 minute, each normal host will send 5 distinct SYN packets 
and receive 4.5 distinct SYN-ACK packets on average, and each worm-affected host will send 
6000 distinct SYN packets and 0 SYN-ACK packet on average. 
To make a fair comparison, both solution will have the same size of memory to process the 
online encoding phase. We conduct three sets of simulations with three different sizes of 
memory allocated for the bitmaps sB  and rB , and the register arrays sM  and rM , 
5 5 5s r s rm m m t t t      5Mb, 2.5Mb, and 1.25Mb, such that the average memory 
consumption per source host will be about 10 bits, 5 bits, and 2.5 bits, accordingly. We set 
512s r s rl l l f f f      . Figure. 4-6 present the simulation results when the allocate 
memory m equals 5Mb, 2.5Mb, and 1.25Mb, respectively. Again, each point in each figure 
represents a source host, with its x-coordinate showing the actual connection failure rate k  (per 
minute) and y-coordinate showing the estimated connection failure rate kˆ  (per minute) 
measured by our schemes. The equality line y = x is also drawn for reference.  
 
Figure 4: Compare DSRA and double-bitmap with 5Mb memory size  
 Figure 5: Compare DSRA and double-bitmap with 2.5Mb memory size 
 
 
Figure 6: Compare DSRA and double-bitmap with 1.25Mb memory size 
 
From the three figures, we can observe that the points in our DSRA scheme are clustered around 
the equality line. Therefore, the measurement result for the connection failure rates of our 
DSRA scheme is accurate under all three different memory constraints. As the memory size 
decreases, Figure. 4-6 show that the measurement result to be slightly deteriorating accuracy. 
However, the double-bitmap scheme is no more accurate when the actual connection failure 
rates are larger than around 2,500, which means its estimation upper bound is limited. One can 
observe that there is a tendency for the measurement upper bound for double-bitmap solution to 
be larger with a bigger memory size. Furthermore, for our DSRA scheme, small memory of size 
(equivalent to 2.5 bits per source host on average) is adequate enough to get sound measurement 
results as shown in Figure. 6. And the upper bound of DSRA scheme is 232 which is appropriate 
in many real applications. Clearly, through above analyses, our DSRA scheme outperforms the 
double-bitmap scheme, because it can work well with a much more strict memory constraint 
and much larger estimation upper bound.  
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper proposes two new method of measuring connection failure rates of individual hosts, 
using two novel data structures: double bitmaps and double register arrays. It addresses an 
important problem in rate-limiting worm propagation, where inaccurate failure rates will affect 
the performance of rate-limit algorithms. The past method relies on ICMP host-unreachable 
messages, which are however widely blocked on today's Internet. The new methods make the 
measurement based on SYN and SYN-ACK packets, which are more reliable and accurate. The 
bitmap design helps significantly to reduce the memory footprint on the routers and eliminates 
the duplicate connection failures (another problem of the previous method). The register array 
design preserves the property of removing the duplicate connection failures, and achieves better 
memory efficiency and much larger estimation range than our bitmap solution. 
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